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In early 2008 the federal government instructed the Productivity Commission (PC) to 
enquire into the social and economic policy issue of paid parental leave (PPL). In their 
draft report, the PC (2008) has called for a taxpayer funded scheme of 18 weeks 
duration, despite Australian governments having so far resisted the introduction of a 
broad grants-based system. A case for government subsidy of PPL can be made on the 
basis that the social benefits exceed the advantages accruing directly to families. 
However, as there are also indisputable private benefits accruing to the parents taking 
leave, there is a case for private contributions. We identify a market failure in that 
commercial banks will not provide funds in the absence of collateral due to repayment 
uncertainty during parental leave, a situation quite similar to the market failure 
inherent with respect to the financing of tuition for higher education (Gans, 2008). To 
address this financing impasse, we consider how an income contingent loan (ICL) 
could be used as an optional supplement to a taxpayer funded PPL scheme. Moral 
hazard and adverse selection are critical policy issues and these are addressed in the 
scheme design by: restricting loan duration and size; restricting eligibility to parents 
with workforce attachment; reducing minimum repayment thresholds to below those 
of HECS; imposing a loan surcharge, and; making the debt an obligation of both 
parents. We explain and present simulations of debt, repayment and subsidies for 
different households. The results show that an optional top-up ICL would not require 
major contributions from taxpayers, yet would introduce flexibility and choice, and 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the last several years there has been enthusiastic debate in Australia concerning 
the merits or otherwise of different government policy approaches to paid parental 
leave (PPL). The importance of PPL as a social and economic issue has not been lost 
on the current government, which announced in February 2008 that the Productivity 
Commission (PC) will examine the issues and present a report by February 2009.
1 
 
The case for PPL can be positioned in a fairly conventional economic theory 
framework, and this is summarised in Section 2. The arguments imply two important 
things about PPL policy: one, that there seems to be a case for some government 
subsidy; and two, that there is an apparent failure in the provision of finance from the 
commercial banking sector to facilitate PPL, thus providing a justification for 
government intervention beyond subsidies. This motivates the consideration of ICL in 
this policy setting. 
 
Included in the PC brief, and in their draft report released in September 2008, is 
identification and assessment of models for financing PPL. The PC was made aware 
of ICL as a potential funding instrument by the authors, but in their draft report (PC, 
2008)
2 chose instead to recommend only a taxpayer funded scheme. We believe there 
remain strong economic and financial arguments for consideration of an ICL of the 
form we explore below.  
 
In Section 3 we outline the proposed ICL scheme as it could be applied to PPL, and 
present pertinent empirical simulations. Much of the basic content of this paper 
follows a recent CEDA report (Chapman, Higgins and Lin, 2008); however the data 
used in the empirical exercises herein, and the results of those exercises, differ. In 
addition, the content has been expanded to include subsidy measures under different 
discount rate assumptions and some basic aggregate costings.  
 
ICL, we argue, have a role to play in financially assisting families when recent 
mothers temporarily leave paid employment for child-rearing purposes. In effect, 
loans of this type allow parents to tax themselves in the future when their incomes are 
relatively high, and transfer these financial resources to themselves when household 
incomes are disrupted from parental leave.  
 
The main contribution of the paper is the explanation and presentation of simulations 
of revenue streams from a top-up ICL. This allows insight into what such an approach 
might mean both for government subsidies and for the financial benefits and costs for 
the families involved.  
 
While the focus is on the use of an ICL in the context of PPL, it is critical to note 
what this paper is not about with respect to policy reform. First, we have not 
examined the extent to which theory and data inform us as to how the total costs of 
PPL should be borne by taxpayers, employers and individual families. There might be 
                                                 
1 Swan (2008). 
2 In their draft report the Productivity Commission proposed the introduction of a taxpayer-funded PPL 
scheme that will provide the minimum wage for 18 weeks for eligible employees, where eligibility is to 
be extended to employees with labour force attachment.   2
a case for contributions from all parties
 if all three benefit from PPL, but our focus is 
instead on how families might be able to finance their own optional component of 
assistance.
3 Second, consistent with the above we consider the use of an ICL income 
contingent loan for financing part of PPL as an addition to the provision of grants 
from taxpayers, whether or not the taxpayer funded component is 18 weeks as 
recommended by the PC. Our aim is to examine how an ICL could assist parents in 
taking additional leave without this significantly adding to the cost for taxpayers.  
 
2  The current situation and the case for intervention 
 
PPL is ‘an income replacement to compensate for the leave from paid employment 
necessary around childbirth’ (HREOC, 2002, p. 13) and is a contemporary public 
policy issue with both social and economic importance, of significance for both 
scholarly debate
4, and government, as evidenced by the current PC Inquiry.  
 
The current state of affairs with PPL provisions in Australia is summarised in the 
PC’s draft report (PC, 2008, Chapter 3). Essentially there exists statutory unpaid 
parental leave provisions with families entitled to up to 52 weeks of unpaid leave
5. 
However, Australia has not legislated for a minimum PPL system across the 
workforce despite recommendations in 2002 by HREOC for a national, government-
funded scheme of 14 weeks PPL (HREOC, 2002).  It is often pointed out by 
proponents of approaches such as these that Australia is one of only two countries in 
the OECD (the United States being the other) in which there is no legislative 
requirement or taxpayer subsidies for PPL. Despite the absence of a universal PPL 
scheme, individual workers in certain areas of employment may have access to PPL 
through collective bargaining, public sector employment benefits, or by working for 
an employer who provides PPL as a key part of their human resources strategy (Baird 
and Litwin, 2005). Although close to 50 per cent of employees had some form of PPL 
available in 2007 (PC, 2008, page 3.1), deficiencies in the current system are apparent 
(see for example, Baird, Brennan, and Cutcher, 2002), with PPL being ‘…relatively 
concentrated among groups who usually have better labour force outcomes, such as 
highly paid workers, professional and permanent full-time workers’ (PC, 2008, p. 
3.26).  
 
Advocates of PPL arrangements argue that current leave arrangements are not 
adequate, and that there are important benefits of a policy which encourages recent 
mothers not to resume paid employment soon after the birth of their child (see, for 
example, HREOC, 2002; O’Neill, 2004). Although the average duration of maternal 
leave among those who take leave is 37 weeks (the majority of which is unpaid 
maternity leave), according to the PC, ‘Many parents return to work earlier than six 
months – often against their own preferences...’ (2008, page xx). Indeed, only 72 per 
cent of employed mothers take leave around childbirth, with the vast majority of those 
who don’t take leave resigning from paid work (PC, 2008, page 3.1). Research 
summarised in the PC draft report suggests that employer retention rates and women’s 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the possible involvement of employers, see Chapman (2002). 
4 For example, see Baird (2004). Also see Baird and Whitehouse (2007) and others in a special issue in 
the Australian Bulletin of Labour on work and family policy issues for Australia. 
5 Workplace.gov.au (2008). Employees taking parental leave have the right to return to their original 
position, to request other leave (such as annual leave), extend parental leave once during the 52 week 
period and vary or shorten the leave.    3
workforce attachment could be improved in the presence of a universal PPL scheme. 
Benefits of appropriately designed PPL may also include improved child and maternal 
health and welfare, and social benefits such as reduction of caring and working 
pressures on parents of young children and the financial independence associated with 
greater employment (see, PC, 2008, for a summary of these and other potential 
benefits).  
 
It is intended by the PC that their draft recommendation of 18 weeks provide 
sufficient postnatal leave so ‘…that when supplemented by people’s private efforts, 
would achieve an appropriate length of absence from work for most families’. At the 
same time they acknowledge that ‘...there is no exact science about choosing the 
precise duration’ (PC, 2008, page xxi), and there are important financial 
considerations. Notably, ‘…the benefits to children and parents from incrementally 
longer periods of leave have to be weighed against their (appreciable) budgetary 
costs…’ (PC, 2008, page xxi).  
 
While a compelling argument for government subsidisation arises from a recognition 
that society benefits from a potentially larger and healthier workforce and from a 
presumed higher productivity and increased tax revenue when parents return to paid 
work, there are also immediate benefits to parents from a PPL scheme (for example, 
in the form of recovery from child birth, or long term positive emotional 
consequences for children). Given the benefits, the question arises as to whether or 
not there should be institutional arrangements to allow those interested to be able to at 
least partially finance their own parental leave if they do not have the private facilities 
to do so; if not, we have a market failure. This leaves the door open for government 
intervention of some form.  
 
First, it is critical to understand the nature of the market failure in this setting. During 
periods of parental leave families experience a significant decline in household 
incomes and this, coupled with asymmetric information concerning future paid labour 
force intentions, restricts the availability of commercial credit. It is unlikely that banks 
would offer loans to poor prospective borrowers because of default risk and the 
absence of collateral. Even in the event that bank loans were available for the 
financing of paid maternity leave, they would have the following undesirable 
characteristics for the borrower: mortgage-type loans do not offer insurance to the 
borrower against default, and in this event there are thus significant issues for the 
borrower’s credit reputation; and, bank loans do not provide protection from the 
potential consumption hardship associated with repayment obligations that are 
insensitive to future capacity to pay.
6  
 
Without government intervention, parents wishing to take leave for child-rearing 
purposes face unpalatable alternatives: a period of considerably reduced incomes and 
consumption; running down savings; and/or the prospect of accessing or extending a 
mortgage loan with undesirable properties. Government intervention in the use or 
part-use of an income contingent loan mechanism could help resolve the issue.  
 
                                                 
6 For extended discussion of issues associated with student financing, see Barr (2001) and Chapman 
(2006).   4
For most families interested in financing PPL, bank loans will not be available in the 
absence of collateral to provide insurance against default. Just as is the case with 
respect to the financing of higher education, an income contingent loan allows 
borrowers the opportunity to distribute income from future propitious periods of their 
economic lives to current periods of need. There is thus a fairly long life-cycle aspect 
to consumption-smoothing from an income contingent loan for PPL.  
 
3  Designing an ICL 
 
In this section we present the design parameters for an ICL for PPL and explore, using 
a simple model at the individual family level, the likely implications for both 
recipients (families) and the provider (the government) of the scheme. The 
exploration of patterns of hypothetical repayments and costs requires two aspects of 
the modelling to be made explicit: the design parameters of a loan scheme, and the 
demographic and financial scenarios of loan recipients. To these ends, and for 
illustrative purposes, we propose policy parameters for the model of a basic scheme, 
and present scenarios of some common family types to show how such a scheme 
might work. For the modelling it has been assumed that the ICL assistance would 
begin immediately after any period of grants-based assistance. 
 
An ICL for PPL needs to give important weight to the potential of both adverse 
selection and moral hazard to undermine such a scheme. Adverse selection could arise 
if those seeking relatively high amounts of support expect to repay relatively low 
proportions of the loan. This could happen, for example, if repayment obligations 
were defined to be the responsibility only of the person undertaking the leave, for 
example, the mother. If she believed it was unlikely that she would ever earn the first 
income threshold of repayment, or expected that it would take a long period of time to 
do so, there would be potential for relatively large taxpayer subsidies. In some 
extreme cases, the loan would effectively turn into a grant. The expected time period 
of repayment is critical in calculations of the extent of taxpayer contributions from a 
scheme. These subsidies can potentially be high, as seen in Chapman and Lounkaew 
(2008), who show that the interest rate subsidies associated with FEE-HELP are 
typically of the order of 25-30 per cent for high debts. 
The circumstances associated with this form of adverse selection would include a 
debtor expecting: (i) not to work in the paid labour market again, or not for a long 
period of time; (ii) not to earn above the first threshold of repayment again, or for a 
long time, perhaps because of the expectation of further children and/or undertaking 
only part-time work; or (iii) to emigrate or spend significant time overseas.  
Similar implications for taxpayer subsidies arise from moral hazard. In this area moral 
hazard takes the form of PPL debtors changing their behaviour in order to avoid 
repaying the debt, or in order to repay it very slowly. This could arise by debtors 
deciding: (i) not to return to paid work, or to return only after a long period; (ii) to 
take part-time instead of full-time work; or (iii) to emigrate or spend significant time 
overseas.  
The scheme is designed in such a way to take account for these potentially 
undermining factors.  
 
 
   5
Employer participation  
An ICL applied to PPL could be structured broadly in two ways: one in which the 
parent(s) is (are) solely responsible for repayment; or one in which the parent(s) is 
(are) responsible for some repayment, but the employer, as a beneficiary of the 
scheme, also plays a role.  
 
The chief area in which an employer could participate would be individually 
negotiated arrangements to repay some part of their employee’s outstanding loan, on 
condition that they return to their original workplace for a specified period. There are 
reasons in labour market theory for promoting such a possibility (see, Becker, 1962). 
In the Becker model of the financing of training, an important distinction is made 
between skill investments that are general (transferable between employers) and firm-
specific (those that are of relevance only in the place in which the skills are acquired). 
In order to minimise the possibility of separation between the firm and the worker, 
and thus the loss of future returns to training investments specific to the firm, it is 
argued that the firm and the worker should jointly finance such investments. 
  
The essential point is that in the event that the parent does not return to the original 
employer there are costs incurred which take the form of foregone returns to the 
firm’s specific training investments in the worker. There is a benefit to be gained 
through re-employment at the original place of work, which constitutes a case for loan 
repayment contributions from the employer. Chapman (2002) suggests that these 
contributions should be made conditional on the parent returning to their original job 
since in this situation the employer gains. One form this might take would be for the 
employer and the employee to share loan repayments for the period in which the 
employee remains with the firm, or until the debt is repaid.  
 
In addition, as raised by Gans (2008), by increasing the probability of the parent 
returning to their original job, shared loan arrangements reduce the risk of 
discrimination against PPL recipients. Shared loan arrangements would also mean 
that the relative contribution to loan payments would be higher for parents choosing 
not to return to the original job. Significantly, and in addition, having employers 
contribute to loan repayments would increase the proportion of debt recovered by 
government and decrease the implicit subsidies. 
 
The simplest arrangement, however, would see parents applying for a loan after an 
initial period of leave financed by taxpayers, with the loan provided by the 
government and to be repaid by the debtor and/or the family depending on the level of 
their future incomes. It is this simple government-provided optional loan scheme, 
excluding employer involvement, which is examined in detail and is the subject of 
modelling in the remainder of this paper.   
 
Loan eligibility 
Conditions on eligibility are essential in order to discourage adverse selection. A poor 
example of how to design an ICL for PPL would be to encourage borrowing from 
prospective parents with weak attachment to the paid labour force, since this is likely 
to result in relatively low repayment of the debt. Eligibility to participate in the loan 
scheme should ideally be restricted to parents in employment prior to the planned 
leave.    6
 
This is consistent with the PC draft that recommends their proposed statutory scheme 
only be available to parents with ‘…an average of at least ten hours employment a 
week (with one or more employers) on a continuous basis for the year prior to the 
expected birth date of the child.’ (PC, 2008, page 2.1). Although not making the loan 
facility available to non-working mothers may be seen as inequitable, the purpose of 
the proposed ICL is as a temporary income replacement while the parent is on leave 
from work, and not as a reward for unpaid care
7. The specific details of what 
constitutes prior employment can be complicated and are the subject of considerable 
discussion in the PC draft report (see, in particular, PC, 2008, page 2.5).  
 
Eligibility conditions relating to past work patterns are not required for the scenarios 
generated here, but would be critical in scheme design and for accurate projections of 
aggregate take-up and costs. Importantly, eligibility criteria based on previous 
employment is not neutral, but will affect choices prospective parents make regarding 
labour force participation. Both couples and single parents who satisfied the previous 
employment condition would be eligible for the ICL under the proposed scheme.  
 
Loan duration and amount 
Under the basic scheme a parent could take out a loan from the government to extend 
leave for 26 weeks (after expiry of an entitlement paid for by taxpayers) for a first 
child (or twins). In our initial modelling we allow a further 26 week extension for a 
subsequent birth. 26 weeks, or 6 months, is supported by the PC as a minimum 
recommended duration for leave (PC, 2008, page xx).  
 
If the policy currently recommended by the PC is implemented, there may be less 
demand for a repayable loan scheme with a 26 week duration. However, the PC’s 
proposal is for 18 weeks of leave, or around eight weeks short of six months. 
Although the PC argues that the majority of parents may have access to private 
sources of PPL to supplement the 18 weeks proposed in the statutory scheme (e.g. 
accumulated recreation leave and employer provided paid maternity schemes), there 
will be parents who aren’t in a position to make up the shortfall to six months or 
somewhat longer if so desired. In this event a shorter ICL may be worth 
contemplating, and to ascertain what a shorter period would mean for the government 
and for families we also present calculations for a ten week loan period. 
 
We have assumed that the size of the loan per fortnight is the hourly federal minimum 
wage
8 multiplied by 76 hours (38 hours per week). With the 26-week cap this comes 
to $14,138. The maximum loan, capped for two children, is twice this amount at 
$28,277; however, for many of those eligible the leave taken and the debt incurred 
would be lower. For comparison, for ten weeks of leave, the loan for one child would 
be $5,438, or $10,876 for two children.  
 
                                                 
7 Additionally, costs including doubtful debt would be considerable if the ICL was offered to all 
parents. 
8 As at October 2008 the Federal Minimum Wage stood at $543.78 per week ($14.31 per hour). 
(Australian Fair Pay Commission, 2008). 
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Debt indexation and surcharge  
As with HECS, we assume the loans are indexed to the CPI. Although this implies a 
zero real interest rate, a surcharge of 20 per cent on the borrowed amounts is proposed 
so the outstanding debt, or amount to be repaid, is 20 per cent more in nominal terms 
than the amount borrowed (for example, if a person borrowed $100 they would have 
to repay $120.) This is consistent with the FEE-HELP loan scheme (DEST, 2007) 
which is available to assist students pay undergraduate tuition for those not covered 
by HECS-HELP. The 20 per cent surcharge is in effect a blunt form of real interest 
rate.  
 
Repayment conditions  
Repayments are made when assessable income exceeds a specified minimum 
threshold. The choice of minimum threshold, and the decision who repays, are 
important considerations in policy design as both can be critical in mitigating the risk 
of adverse selection. In this context there are two major design features of the scheme. 
 
First, the repayments of the ICL should be made the obligation of both parents 
(provided they are a couple at the time of the loan contract). Importantly, this would 
reduce the risk that a mother takes out the loan with the intention of never returning to 
work or intentionally keeping their income below the minimum threshold. In this 
situation total repayments during each time period are the sum of the two repayment 
amounts, which are assessed based on each of the parent’s individual incomes. This is 
feasible logistically as the current tax collection mechanism in Australia allows for the 
collection of spouse details. Moreover, if both parents are treated individually by the 
Australian Taxation Office in the calculation of the compulsory repayment, this 
removes a possible complication in the event the parents separate. In this 
circumstance the outstanding balance would remain a liability of both parties 
irrespective of the status of their relationship.  
 
A complication that could potentially arise is moral hazard manifesting from parents 
intentionally not declaring themselves as a couple in order to avoid the father’s 
liability. To guard against this risk, discounts on the loan or freezing of interest on the 
debt could be considered for those declaring two persons as liable on the loan 
document. Similarly, to further reduce taxpayer subsidies by increasing the chance of 
repayments, for single parents who wish to take advantage of discounts for multiple 
signatories, the loan rules could be expanded to allow other individuals (for example, 
a direct family member) to take liability by signing the loan document, though these 
considerations are not modelled here. 
 
Second, to mitigate the possible costs due to non-retrieval of debt due to low future 
incomes a lower first income threshold of repayment for the scheme is proposed
9. 
This is likely to be particularly appropriate for the small minority of mothers living 
separately from the father of their child at the time of the parental leave. In order to 
avoid hardships associated with repayment in this circumstance there would be a 
commensurate reduction in the proportion of income required (from the four per cent 
with HECS, to, say, two per cent).  
                                                 
9 This approach is adopted by Chapman, Freiberg, Quiggin and Tait (2004) with respect to the 
modelling of an income contingent fine payment system for low level criminal offences.    8
 
To achieve the above we use the minimum income repayment threshold of $28,259, 
which is equivalent to the exempt income amount under the Australian Child Support 
System (CSS)
10 for a parent with a dependant child under the age of 13 in 2008. This 
threshold is chosen for the current exercise as it is considered to be a suitable proxy 




Thus for our exercises we use the 2008–09 HECS repayment rules
12 adjusted by 
imposing the additional requirement taken from the CSS rules, resulting in the annual 
payment thresholds and rates shown in Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 inserted here] 
 
Additional parameters  
Because the scheme involves repayments over time with differing indexation 
arrangements, some assumptions are required with respect to price and wage change: 
these are 2.5 per cent (the middle of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s acceptable band 
for price inflation) and 4 per cent per annum respectively, which are the approximate 
rates over the last few years in Australia (RBA, 2008a). Consistent with the HECS-
HELP and FEE-HELP arrangements, we adjust the income thresholds for this 
assumed rate of growth in average weekly earnings. As is now the case with current 
ICLs, there is no liability for repayment of the debt from the debtor’s estate upon the 
death of the borrower. Further, in the modelling undertaken for this exercise a 52-
week waiting period has been applied from the final loan payment before repayments 
are required.  
 
Dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard: summary 
The scheme design has both adverse selection and moral hazard firmly in mind. 
Summarising the design features that aid in control, first, eligibility is restricted to a 
parent or parents in employment prior to paid maternity leave. Second, both parents 
are responsible for the debt obligation provided both are present at the time of the 
leave. Third, a 20 per cent surcharge is imposed on the loan, which may deter 
participation from borrowers who are tempted to take out the loan due to the low debt 
indexation rates. Fourth, a low first income threshold below that applying to HECS is 
applied to the loan. 
 
Despite these features the PC raises the possible disincentive to exceed the income 
threshold as a criticism of ICL applied to PPL, thus  ‘…reducing their incentives to 
work at the margin…’ (2008, page 8.14). So as to not burden debtors on low incomes, 
the first rate of repayment for a parent was intentionally set at the low level in which 
                                                 
10 see http://www.csa.gov.au/guide/2_4_2.htm. This amount is higher than the exempt income level 
available for parents with no dependents due to the costs associated with raising a child. 
11 Under the CSS the income used in the determination of support differs with the number of dependent 
children, but for the sake of simplicity this has been ignored here. The income threshold of $34,926 per 
annum was selected because it is approximately mid-way between the new minimum threshold and the 
HECS minimum. Determination of rules for calculating repayments in practice can be particularly 
complex and so will not be explored further here. An appreciation of the complexity in such schemes 
can be gleaned from examination of the rules for the CSS. 
12 See http://www.goingtouni.gov.au   9
only two per cent of income ($539.06 per annum, or less than $11 per week for an 
income of $28,260) would be required to pay off the debt. It seems unlikely to us that 




In Australia there is an additional issue of PPL borrowers potentially having an 
existing HECS debt. The prospect of a similar debt for PPL might encourage 
relatively high borrowings from former higher education students (a case of adverse 
selection) and/or disincentives to reach the first income threshold of repayment 
because the financial benefits of this type of avoidance are relatively high if the total 
income contingent loan debt is high (a case of moral hazard). Explorations of the 
extent of the above potential problem by Dr Peng Yu (private correspondence) using 
Wave Six (2006) of the HILDA survey reveal, however, that the issue is not very 
important empirically. The data imply that only around one-tenth of young mothers 
who would have been potentially eligible for an ICL for PPL also have a HECS debt. 
Nevertheless, the number and magnitude of HECS debts is rising, and multiple ICL 
debt obligations could conceivably become a financial strain should a new variant of 
the scheme be introduced. A simple way forward would be to group all such debts 
together, and have one on-going compulsory repayment based on income. This would 
have the effect of extending the duration of the loan(s), thus increasing the net 
subsidy, but not the amount of the annual repayment obligation.  
 
Scenarios - constructing a basic model  
Four scenarios have been chosen to reflect family units which might be expected to 
utilise the ICL. The scenarios illustrate how the policy might work in practice by 
showing patterns of outstanding debt, repayments, and government subsidy (due to 
the zero real indexation on the outstanding debt). The four scenarios are summarised 
in Table 2, and the results are provided in the section following. 
 
[Table 2 inserted here] 
 
Scenarios 1 and 2 are two-parent households with two children, while scenarios 3 and 
4 are single-parent households with one child. For the two couple scenarios the father 
is assumed to be working full-time, and the mother works full-time under scenario 1 
after returning from leave with the second child, whereas she works part-time under 
scenario 2 and doesn’t return to full-time employment. We assume that the loan is 
taken out for the maximum of 26 weeks (or ten weeks for the additional example) 
following the birth of each child and the expiration of a period of grants-based 
assistance. Under scenarios 3 and 4 the mother is a single parent with one child, and 
for the former she takes PPL, after which she returns to part-time paid work for two 
years before full-time paid work, whereas under scenario 4 she remains in part-time 
paid work following expiration of the leave.  
 
While the empirical exercises include single mothers, rather than single fathers, this 
allows us to keep the analysis straightforward, with extensions of ICL into more 
flexible parental leave arrangements being a desirable area for future analysis. 
                                                 
13 This is supported by Chapman and Leigh (forthcoming, 2009) who show that for HECS, while there 
is a statistically significant amount of bunching below the first threshold, in empirical and economic 
terms the effect is trivial.   10
 
Justification for selecting these family compositions comes from ABS statistics (for 
example, Australian Social Trends (ABS, 2007b); 2006 Census (ABS, 2006b)). 
Among other things, the data reveal that 75 per cent of partnered fathers with 
dependent children work full-time, and close to 70 per cent of both single and 
partnered mothers engage in full-time or part-time paid work by the time their 
children have reached their teenage years
14. These statistics would no doubt be greater 
if we only include parents who engaged in paid work prior to having children.  
 
In all scenarios the father is assumed to be aged 33 and the mother aged 31 at the time 
of birth of the first child, ages consistent with the 2006 Australian median ages of 
33.1 and 30.8 respectively (ABS, 2006a). We assume assessable income is below the 
minimum threshold once parents retire, and retirement is assumed to occur at ages 62 
for men and 58 for women (ABS, 2007a). 
 
Income assumptions 
As loan repayments are contingent on income, projected future debtor income is a 
critical assumption for the scenarios. Specifically, the measure of income that we 
assume for calculation of loan repayment obligations, known henceforth as assessable 
income, is equal to taxable income, plus any reduction in taxable income due to rental 
loss, plus fringe benefits and exempt foreign employment income. This is the same 
definition as applies under the HECS-HELP scheme
15. 
 
Assessable incomes were approximated by extracting relevant components of income 
from the ABS 2003-04 and 2005–06 surveys of Income and Housing Confidentialised 
Unit Record File (CURF) (ABS, 2004; ABS, 2006c). In addition to the specific 
components of income, age group, sex, employment status (full-time and part-time), 
and relationship status (single or partnered) were extracted for all individuals in the 
surveys. The data from both surveys were adjusted with AWOTE growth to the 
present (ABS, 2008) and average 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles (lower, median and 
upper quartiles) were calculated from the adjusted data across the two surveys.  
 
As the CURF data is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, adjustments are made to 
the data for projection purposes. Projections of assessable income in subsequent years 
allow for increases due to gains in productivity, inflation and returns to experience or 
promotion. For an individual aged g at time t, the projected quartile of income for the 
same individual aged g+1 at time t+1 was approximated by taking the income quartile 
at age g+1 and time t, and inflating this by projected growth in average weekly 
earnings to time t+1. This was repeated for future years and for median-, lower- and 
upper- income quartiles. 
 
                                                 
14 That the majority of mothers either return to paid work part-time or full-time following leave to have 
children is supported by research from other sources including: Australian Institute of Family Studies 
(2007); Whitehouse, Baird, Diamond and Hosking (2006); and Social Policy Research Centre (2006). 
15 See http://www.goingtouni.gov.au   11
Subsidy calculations 
An ICL for PML does not strictly imply a user-pays scheme, since there is a cost to 
the government and taxpayer if debtors fail to reach the repayment thresholds and 
never repay the debt. There is also a potential cost to government even if the loan is 
repaid, due to the zero real interest rate. These subsidies can be expressed as the 
present value of the difference between how much is provided by the government and 
how much is repaid by the borrower, as a proportion of the amount provided, using an 
appropriate discount rate. If a borrower repays none of the debt, this is equivalent to a 
100 per cent subsidy to the borrower. But because of the 20 per cent surcharge, the 
present value of repayments can exceed the amount outlaid, and consequently a   
negative subsidy can result. The scenarios examined in our exercises reveal the 
circumstances under which positive or negative subsidies can arise. For the scenarios 
explored herein, the discount rate chosen to calculate the present value of the 
repayments and new debt is (nominal) 5.5 per cent, being the approximate average 
10-year government bond rate over the last five years (RBA, 2008b). 
 
4 Results   
 
Results for the four scenarios are now presented under the assumption of loan 
amounts based on a leave period of 26 weeks. Three income levels, low (25th 
percentile), medium (50th percentile), and high (75th percentile) are given for each 
scenario
16. For scenarios one and two, the parents are assumed to have two children 
and hence the amount borrowed ($28,277) is twice the single amount ($14,138).  
Figure 1 illustrates the time stream of repayments of the debts, and Figure 2 illustrates 
the time stream of outstanding debt. The following points are noteworthy from the 
two figures:  
1.  The repayments follow a step shape, which is a consequence of the increments to 
income being calculated annually.  
2.  The accumulation of debt early in the life of the loan takes a stepped appearance 
in scenarios one and two due to the loan amount increasing when leave is taken 
for the second child.  
3.  There are large differences in time to repayment in all scenarios depending on 
income, ranging from about five years to 17 years for two-parent families with 
two children.  
4.  For single mothers on median part-time incomes who never return to full-time 
work, considerable time is taken until total debt is repaid, and for single mothers 
who earn at the lower 25th income percentile of part-time income, their income is 
below the lowest repayment threshold and as a consequence no debt is repaid at 
any stage.  
 
[Figure 1 inserted here] 
 
[Figure 2 inserted here] 
 
Table 3 presents the subsidy proportions for each income band within each scenario, 
along with the present value of both the amount outlaid by the government and the 
                                                 
16 For the couple scenarios, 1 and 2, the 25th and 75th percentile cases mean that both male and female 
income profiles are the 25th and 75th percentile levels respectively.   12
amount repaid by the borrower, both for loans based on leave duration of 26 weeks 
and ten weeks. The subsidies are determined by the interest rate differential (being the 
difference between the indexation rate of CPI applied to the loan and the discount rate 
of 5.5 per cent per annum), the 20 per cent surcharge, and the unique future income 
circumstances of the specific borrowers (which affects the time until repayment of the 
loan).  
 
[Table 3 inserted here] 
 
Of note in Table 3 is the sensitivity of results to the amount of debt accrued. Reducing 
the amount of leave from 26 to ten weeks, and thereby the amount of debt accrued, 
significantly reduces the subsidy in all cases with the exception of the lowest income 
quartile for scenario 4 where the mother’s income is such that no debt is repaid.  
 
Table 3 illustrates that repaying the loan quickly provides negative taxpayer subsidies 
(as the benefits to the government from the loan surcharge more than offset the 
opportunity cost of the low loan indexation rate), and those repaying slowly or 
incompletely will generate positive – and in some cases, potentially large – subsidies 
(as the costs of low loan indexation rates outweigh the benefits to the government of 
the surcharge.)  
 
It is apparent from examination of the scenarios that the highest positive subsidies are 
received by those families most in financial need over their lifetimes. Single mothers, 
particularly those on low incomes, take the longest time to repay or don’t repay the 
loan, and consequently benefit most from the low loan indexation. This feature of 
distributing most benefit to those with greater financial need is common to ICL with 
interest rate arrangements that have been adopted for HECS-HELP and FEE-HELP. It 
is clear also that the income contingent nature of the loan provides for default 
protection, as highlighted for single mothers earning low part-time incomes.  
 
Median- and high-income earners, namely those at the 50th and 75th income 
percentile under scenarios 1, 2 and 3, experience negative subsidies due to the role of 
the surcharge. The subsidies in Table 3 indicate the net position for the government, 
and do not reflect whether or not a parent, who may have a different, and higher, cost 
of capital, would benefit financially from participation. One way of exploring this 
issue is to find the discount rate that would set the subsidy to zero per cent for each 
income quartile within each scenario. These are presented in Table 4 for the 26 week 
loan. If a parent could borrow funds privately below these equivalent discount rates, 
then their costs of servicing the private loan would be less than the costs they would 
otherwise face through an ICL. For example, for a single parent on the lowest quartile 
of full-time income, they would have to borrow at a rate below 4.6 per cent per annum 
for the repayments to be less onerous than those available through the ICL. This 
comparison between an ICL and private loans is not as simple as it appears however, 
as the default protection implicit in the contingent nature of the ICL is an added 
attraction that is not replicated in the credit markets.  
 
[Table 4 inserted here] 
 
Although negative subsidies do not imply that the loan may be financially unattractive 
to parents, there will remain circumstances of non-participation from some parents   13
with the financial means to provide for their own leave. Although one may see this as 
an equitable outcome as the policy then targets those groups most in need, choices 
made along these lines have an adverse selection dimension as well, since if those 
who avoid participation would have otherwise generated a negative subsidy, this has 
the effect of increasing the overall taxpayer subsidy from the policy.  
 
What are the implications of these scenarios for aggregate costings ? It is apparent 
from the results that a large taxpayer cost could arise from single parents on low 
incomes. Although an ICL scheme’s viability would be questionable if this 
demographic was the primary group in the population, nationally lone parents make 
up fewer than 15 per cent of families with young dependents
17. In fact, only a 
proportion of these parents would contribute solely to the costs of their loan, since in 
some cases both parents would have existed as a couple (ABS, 2007b) at the time the 
loan was agreed. In these circumstances the father would be expected to contribute 
following divorce or separation under the scheme design parameters introduced here.  
 
Even given substantial adverse selection, manifesting by the dominance of single 
parent families in the scheme, a simple simulation shows that aggregate costs would 
be small. We assume that 50 per cent of take-up is by single parents, compared with 
an actual population proportion of 15 per cent corresponding to single parents, and 
that  of the single parents (and also the couples), 50 per cent of those participating are 
in the lowest income quartile
18. The aggregate government subsidy under these quite 
extreme circumstances is just 12 per cent assuming 26 weeks of leave, or just four per 
cent when based on ten weeks of leave. Under assumptions of no adverse selection, 
the aggregate subsidy would be close to minus two per cent for 26 weeks of leave, or 
minus ten per cent for ten weeks of leave. These calculations suggest that, even in 
conditions of pervasive adverse selection, the policy would not be costly.   
 
5 Discussion  and  conclusion 
 
An income contingent loan for PPL can introduce flexibility and choice for parents by 
being promoted not as an alternative to a government-funded leave scheme, but rather 
as an optional supplement. In terms of economic theory, government intervention of 
this type can be justified due to the presence of social spillovers from PPL that are not 
being delivered due to a market failure. The market failure in this setting is the 
unavailability of loans from commercial institutions for parental leave purposes in the 
circumstances of no saleable collateral and associated high risks of default.  
 
An ICL for PPL, as for similar applications, delivers to borrowers consumption 
smoothing. By only requiring repayments when the family is in a suitable financial 
position, the policy effectively allows parents to transfer income from future 
propitious times to a preceding period when household incomes have fallen as a result 
of a parent’s non-participation in paid work. 
 
                                                 
17 This statistic was obtained from the ABS 2005-06 Income and Housing Confidential Unit Record 
File based on families with dependents aged zero to two (ABS, 2006c). 
18 We assume that 25 per cent have the median income and 25 per cent have the upper quartile of 
income. Further we assume that 50 per cent of single families are full-time and 50 per cent are part-
time.    14
As illustrated in the empirical exercises, the scheme is progressive within the group of 
borrowers considered.  Debtors with low future incomes and in particular single 
mothers, would repay the loan relatively slowly, meaning higher taxpayer subsidies, 
whereas those with higher incomes repay more quickly. The exercises suggest that the 
extent of the implicit rate subsidy may be as high as 100 per cent for single mothers 
with very low lifetime incomes, but this would be a rare circumstance. For single 
mothers working full-time but in the lowest 25th income percentile, the extent of the 
subsidy is around seven per cent. For the majority of potential PPL borrowers, 
however, the subsidies are very small and may be negative in cases of families 
receiving full-time median incomes. As suggested, an ICL would be financially 
attractive, despite negative government subsidies, to parents who may either have no 
alternative means or who face costly alternatives.  
 
Take-up rates would be likely to be higher for members of groups who expect to be 
relatively poor, for two reasons. First, these mothers are more likely to be unable to 
finance a period of extended leave by other means. Second, those expecting to have 
relatively low incomes in the future are more likely to be interested in taking the loan 
because of higher expected interest rate subsidies. This possibility, while implying 
additional potential progressivity of the scheme, is of course not necessarily an 
advantage. Adverse selection of this type imposes higher costs in terms of taxpayer 
subsidies. As shown in Section 3, the scheme has been designed with focussed 
consideration of adverse selection and moral hazard. While the innovations suggested 
would diminish the likelihood of the scheme resulting in substantial taxpayer 
subsidies, the prospect remains. However, even under significant adverse selection, 
some rough estimates suggest that aggregate taxpayer costs (excluding administrative 
expenses), would very likely be negligible. 
   15
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Table 1. Repayment Thresholds and Rates for PPL scheme 
Repayment threshold  Repayment rate (per cent) 











$77,248 and above 8.0 
 
Table 2:  The Scenarios under Analysis 
1  Couple with two children 
Mother’s employment: NW-PT-NW-PT-FT 
(PT for 1 year between the two NW phases, 
PT for 2 years following birth of 2nd child 
before returning FT) 
Father’s employment: FT 
2  Couple with two children 
Mother’s employment: NW-PT-NW-PT 
(PT for 1 year between the two NW phases, 
PT following birth of 2nd child) 
Father’s employment: FT 
 
3  Single with one child 
Mother’s employment: NW-PT-FT  
(PT for two years before returning FT) 
4  Single with one child 
Mother’s employment: NW-PT  
(PT continually after maternity leave) 
Key: FT = full-time paid work; NW = on maternity leave and not in paid work; PT = part-time paid 
work. 
 
Table 3: Government Subsidies for Different Scenarios 
Scenario  Present value 
of the amount 
outlaid ($) 
Present value of the repayments 
($) 




  25%  50%  75% 25%  50%  75% 
26 week loan            
1 26,286  26,159  28,382  29,410 0  -8  -12 
2 26,286  24,707  27,995  29,368 6  -6  -12 
3 13,765  12,742  13,990  14,838 7  -2  -8 
4 13,765 -  11,052  13,135 100  20  5 
10 week loan               
1 10,274  11,229  11,666  11,886 -9  -14  -16 
2 10,274  11,076  11,660  11,886 -8  -13  -16 
3 5,338  5,558  5,788  5,958 -4  -8  -12 
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25%  50%  75%
1 5.5 7.8  10.5
2 4.7 7.2  10.4
3 4.6 5.8 7.7
4 NA 3.8 4.9
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